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The Need for Speed: Regulatory
Approaches to High Frequency
Trading in the United States and
the European Union
ABSTRACT

High frequency trading(HFT) is a financial investment execution
technique with a growing presence in world financial markets.
Investment firms engaging in HFT use computer-automated
algorithms to trade financial instruments at high speeds. There is
much debate as to what HFT entails, particularly its risks, benefits,
and costs, and whom HFT affects (positively or negatively). In
particular, this Note addresses efforts in the United States and the
European Union to define and regulate HFT. The proposed Regulation
Systems Compliance and Integrity (Reg SCI) and Regulation
Automated Trading (Reg AT) in the United States and Markets in
FinancialInstruments Directive II (MiFID II) in the European Union
contemplate measures to increase transparency and decrease volatility
surrounding HFT, particularly in light of flash crashes in various
influential markets. Recent events like the emergence of the Investors
Exchange (IEX) and the flash crash following "Brexit"draw the role of
HFT in ensuring the continued operation of the market into higher
relief. As such, combining elements from both US and EU regimes to
create a "transparency within reason" approach will help balance
competing interests in effectively addressing HFT through a cohesive
framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"People no longer are responsible for what happens in the market,
because computers make all the decisions."' High frequency trading
(HFT) is a phenomenon some perceive as the next imminent failure of
modern markets. To critics like Michael Lewis, author of Flash Boys:
A Wall Street Revolt, HFT is a scheme by which computer whizzes
can program computers with algorithms to cheat more traditional
investors out of an honest day's work.2 While dramatized, his
depiction captures the heart of critics' argument that HFT should be
regulated because it represents the worst of technological innovation
and human nature combined.
Yet others perceive HFT as a market-moving mechanism that
benefits the exchange of securities and derivatives and a natural
progression of market competition. In FlashBoys: Not So Fast, former
Goldman Sachs trader Peter Kovac critiqued Lewis's attacks on HFT
and the related call for regulation, denouncing the alleged "cheat"
aspect of HFT and possibly fully discrediting the existence of HFT. 3

See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT 270 (2014)
1.
(asserting that the US stock market faces the increasingly controlling influence of
computer-based technology).
See id. at 3.
2.
3.
See generally PETER KOVAC, FLASH BOYS: NOT So FAST: AN INSIDER'S
PERSPECTIVE ON HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING (2014) (evaluating Michael Lewis's
stipulations about HFT).
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If nothing else, this feud demonstrates that HFT is on the
public's mind, and certainly not for the first time. Starting as far back
as the "Black Monday Crash" of October 19, 1987, when the stock
market took its steepest ever single-day dive, many saw such stark
volatility as a failure of market makers, Which HFT traders are now
considered. 4 More recently, the 2008 Financial Crisis instilled a
renewed aversion to risk and set the stage for the rise of HFT, since
HFT is a seemingly low risk operation. The May 2010 "Flash Crash"
highlighted HFT's effect on computer-driven markets as "far more
dangerous than anyone had realized," 5 even though markets quickly
rebounded to recover all losses that same day.6
As HFT traders have gained further influence in the markets,
regulatory efforts have multiplied in the interest of leveling the
playing field between more traditional algorithmic trading and HFT.
In particular, regulators are concerned that the speed at which HFT
traders operate could marginalize traditional traders and potentially
destabilize markets.7 Attempts to address such concerns include the

U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission's (SEC) proposed Regulation
System Compliance and Integrity (Reg SCI) in 2014 and, more
recently, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC)
proposed Regulation Automated Trading (Reg AT). 8 Moreover, a new
US stock exchange, Investors Exchange (IEX), recently began
operations on the premise of heightening efficiency and fairness
among traders.9
While US regulatory efforts have seen mixed results, in April
2016 the European Union implemented a plan for the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II). Fully effective in 2018,
MiFID II represents the European Union's first attempt to regulate

4.
See Scott Patterson, Man vs. Machine: Seven Major Players in HighFrequency Trading, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39038892
[https://perma.cc/PH7D-XVWUI (archived Oct. 4, 2016) (noting the relationship
between HFT and the stock market crash of 1987).
5.
See ScOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS
AND THE RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET 3 (2013).
6.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N [hereinafter SEC], EQUITY MARKET
STRUCTURE
LITERATURE
REVIEW:
HIGH
FREQUENCY
TRADING
11
(2014),

https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/researchlhft-lit-review-march_2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N8HH-TGEA] (archived Oct. 4, 2016) (noting HFT's large selling
pressure that may have exacerbated market volatility during the Flash Crash).
7.
See Tim Cave, EU Regulators Agree on Definition of HFT, FIN. NEWS (Apr.
25,
2016),
http://www.efmancialnews.com/story/2016-04-25/eu-regulators-agree-ondefinition-of-hft [https://perma.cclBZ27-PCQ4]
(archived Oct. 4, 2016) (noting
regulators' universal concern that HFT may negatively affect markets).
8.
See
SEC,
SEC
SPOTLIGHT:
REGULATION
SCI
(2016),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regulation-sci.shtml
[https://perma.cc/93TZ-J7HJ
(archived Mar. 1, 2017).
9.
For
more
information
on
the
IEX
concept,
see
IEX,
https://www.iextrading.com [https://perma.cclP4KS-378H] (archived Oct. 4, 2016); see
also LEWIS, supra note 1, at 164 ("[IEX's] goal was not to exterminate the hyenas and
the vultures but, more subtly, to eliminate the opportunity for the kill.").
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HFT and could be a step in a long line of future regulations. 10 Like
the United States, the European Union has seen HFT account for an
increasing proportion of trading, but as of yet European HFT traders
have escaped the level of oversight applied to other traders (i.e.,
brokers)."
But what exactly is HFT, and how can it be regulated without
completely smothering market competition? This Note addresses the
debate across the United States and the European Union on HFT as a
practice. Part II compares efforts to reach a holistic definition of HFT
and its common strategies in the United States and the European
Union. Part III evaluates HFT in terms of its prominence in and
impact on markets in the United States and the European Union.
Part IV compares US and EU approaches to regulate HFT,
particularly the US Reg SCI and Reg AT and the EU MiFID II. Part
V evaluates the approaches discussed in Part IV in light of regulators'
concerns and the individualized needs of the United States and the
European Union.

II. DEFINITIONS: WHAT EXACTLY IS HFT?

The debate over how to regulate HFT originates in its definition.
To fully understand HFT, one must first distinguish it from larger
umbrellas of trading, such as algorithmic trading. Algorithmic
trading usually refers to fund managers' use of trading strategies to
exchange large volumes of assets at minimized cost under preset
limits of risk and time.' 2 The crux of algorithmic trading lies in these
preset rules on how to execute each trade order; the goal is to secure a
good price relative to specified benchmarks and to minimize the
impact of trading by actively responding to events in the market.' 3
HFT, which refers to complete automation of the quantitative
trading process, forms a subset of algorithmic trading.1 4 HFT narrows
the scope of algorithmic trading because it uses computer-automated
algorithms to execute trades without human influence.1 5 Such
computer automation hinges on quantitative modeling and indicator
tracking to determine when and how to execute trades, taking

10.
See Cave, supra note 7.
11.
See id.
12.
See generally Ash Booth, The Difference Between Automated, Algorithmic
16, 2012),
and High-Frequency Trading, DR. ASH BOOTH BLOG (Nov.
http://www.ashbooth.com/blog/2012/11/16/the-difference-between-automatedalgorithmic-and-high-frequency-trading/ [https://perma.cc/7ZQE-PLJ7] (archived Oct.
4, 2016) (distinguishing between algorithmic trading, automated trading, and HFT).
13.
See id.
14.
See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 4;
see also Booth, supranote 12.
15.
See Booth, supra note 12.
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traders' activism out of the equation except in the event of "flash
crashes." Hedge funds typically implement algorithmic trading to
execute trades and monitor portfolio risk, and HFT can be used to
incorporate this information into pricing and trading decisions.1 6
Most agree that the hallmark of HFT is its transience; HFT
traders seek and act on opportunities in a matter of milliseconds
(thousandths of a second). 17 While many brokers and dealers offer
solely algorithmic trading, algorithmic trading is less anticipatory,
less high-frequency, and less high-tech than HFT. Beyond the time
frame, however, characterization of HFT is hazy. From types of
securities traded to specific trading strategies, authorities across the
United States and the European Union lack uniformity in their
descriptions.
A. Key Characteristicsof HFT
Recent US and EU attempts to outline the key characteristics of
HFT share a lack of commitment to a set of uniform features. The
SEC has named non-defining but important criteria for HFT in the
United States. 18
Along with short time frames and the use of algorithms, the SEC
highlights the location of computer servers close to trade exchanges, a
phenomenon known as co-location.1 9 The amount of time taken to
execute a trade, down to the millisecond, can greatly affect who gets
to trade on that particular opportunity. So, the greater the physical
distance from the server to the actual exchange (i.e., New York Stock
Exchange [NYSE]), the longer it takes for the computer signal to
travel round trip to execute the trade.20 As a result, a new sideline
market has arisen in which HFT competitors pay millions of dollars
for the right to place their servers in the same room as the exchange
hub to eke out an edge of mere milliseconds. 2 1 Such competition also
breeds from the algorithms used by each HFT trader, so in reserving
the coveted floor space in the exchanges, HFT traders cautiously

See id.
16.
See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in
17.
Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1623 (2015) [hereinafter Algorithmic Trading]
(discussing how HFT involves securities exchanging hands in milliseconds).
See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supranote 6, at 4.
18.
19.
See id.
20.
See id. (noting the creation of the market surrounding "proximity services,"
or co-location, through which traders paid to limit the distance between their
computers that sent orders into the stock market and the stock exchange hubs).
See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 60, 135-39 (describing Goldman Sachs's co21.
location efforts).
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physically cover their servers such that no information will leak to
the competition.2 2
The SEC also characterizes HFT as using small amounts of daily
capital to make a tiny gain per individual transaction. HFT traders
generate money by trading for small increments of time and making
incremental but steady profits on each individual trade. 2 3 Because of
the high speed at which HFT traders execute trades, they process a
high volume of transactions per day and thus turn a significant profit.
Furthermore, HFT traders cancel over 90 percent of their orders
before they are executed (see the "order anticipation" HFT strategy
discussed in Part II.B). 24 This creates the perception that HFT is a
low-risk operation, as several HFT firms can boast minimal losses
over years of trading. 25
While the characteristics and behaviors the SEC specifies are not
limited to HFT, they outline the baseline view of HFT in the United
States-fast, profitable, and competitive, for better or for worse.
B.

HFT Strategies

The International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) characterizes HFT not as a single strategy but as a "set of
technological arrangements and tools employed in a wide number of
strategies, each one having a different market impact and hence
raising different regulatory issues." 26 The three most prominent
strategies of HFT-order anticipation, market making, and
arbitrage-rely heavily on the speed at which HFT operates.
The order anticipation HFT strategy arguably receives the most
attention of the three prominent strategies because some see it as the
driver of unfairness behind HFT.2 7 As a directional strategy, order

22.
See id. at 64-65 ("The HFT firm insisted on leaving the Toys 'R' Us logos in
place [on the computer cage] so that no one would know they had improved their
position, in relation to the matching engine, by several feet.").
23.

See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supranote 6, at 4.

24.
See Algorithmic Trading supra note 17, at 1623; see also Irene Aldridge,
Market Microstructure and the Risks of High-Frequency Trading 2-4 (Aug. 19, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294526 [https://perma.cc/65JG7PEA] (archived Oct. 4, 2016) (asserting that around 95 percent of limit orders on
NASDAQ are cancelled within one minute of being placed).
25.
See, e.g., Virtu Financial, Inc., Registration Statement Filing (Form S-1)
(Mar. 10, 2014) (noting how Virtu Financial had lost money on only one day in four
years of trading).
26.
INTL ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY: CONSULTATION

REPORT
23
(2011),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD354.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XQF-V4TY] (archived Nov. 5, 2016).
27.
See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 53 (describing order anticipation as being
"front-run-that some other trader was, in effect, noticing his demand for stock on one

exchange and buying it on others in anticipation of selling it to him at a higher price");
see also PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 4-5 ("The heart of the problem ...
was that fast-
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anticipation involves parsing out whether a major investor has placed
a large order such that an HFT trader can use its advantageous speed
to trade ahead of that investor. 28 To outmaneuver the major investor,
HFT traders engage in "pinging." That is, HFT traders use pattern
algorithms to send out "feeler-orders" to find potential larger orders
and determine how large traders may behave.2 9 Because HFT traders
can submit high volumes of these feeler-orders quickly, they can
capitalize on opportune orders ahead of traditional investors.3 0 The
feeler-orders are usually cancelled; as mentioned in Part II.a.1,
approximately 90 percent of orders in HFT are cancelled.3 1 Thus,
HFT traders can quickly enter and exit the market with marginal
gain before traditional investors can act on the same opportunities.
The market-making HFT strategy involves HFT traders'
immediate readiness to buy and sell securities using their own
capital, boosting market liquidity.3 2 Combined with their ability to
make high volumes of trades in mere milliseconds, HFT traders
dominate over traditional traders as market makers.3 3 In fact, Virtu
Financial, a renowned HFT firm, acts as the designated market
maker for the NYSE. 34 A 2013 study found that market making and
other opportunistic HFT strategies, particularly more passive
market-making activity, mitigated short term price volatility in
Swedish equity markets.35 In this way, HFT may fill a vital economic
role by driving the market through its purchases and sales.
Like the market-making strategy, the arbitrage strategy can be
seen to play a beneficial economic role in moving markets. HFT
traders engage in arbitrage by searching markets for securities with
prices that vary between different exchanges. 36 By relying on time
advantages and algorithms, HFT traders can trade away the
differences in prices more cheaply and expediently, paving the way

moving robot trading machines were front-running long-term investors on exchanges

such as the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market.").
28.
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1629-30.
29.
See id.
See id.
30.
31.
For rates of HFT order cancellation, see Scott Patterson & Andrew
Ackerman, SEC May Ticket Speeding Traders, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203918304577239440668644280
[https://perma.cc/LSC8-YR4N] (archived Oct. 4, 2016).
32.
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1628; see also Yesha Yadav,
Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968, 975 (2016) [hereinafter
Insider Trading] ("By virtue of constantly buying and selling, these HFT traders often
fulfill what amounts to an economic market making function by being immediately
available to trade with investors.").
33.
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1628.
34.
See Insider Trading, supra note 32, at 975 n.19.
35.
Bjorn Hagstr6mer and Lars Nord6n, The Diversity of High-Frequency
Traders (2012), https://ssrn.comlabstract=2153272
[https://perma.cclNEY5-HAYL]
(archived Nov. 5, 2016).
36.
See Algorithmic Trading, supranote 17, at 1627-28.
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for traders to engage in market making.3 7 A 2012 study found that
the entry of a large, primarily passive HFT firm into the market for
Dutch stocks correlated with a 15 percent decline in effective price
spreads.3 8 However, while investors may experience lower price
differences after HFT traders enter the market, critics warn that
those investors are effectively forced out of earning the associated
spread as HFT traders may "snipe" the better prices.3 9 As such, one
should not overemphasize large spread reductions and volume
increases associated with HFT entry as evidence of strong market
improvement. 40
The SEC stipulates two additional categories of strategiesstructural and directional "moment ignition"-that closely resemble
the three main strategies. 4 1 Through the use of structural strategies,
which bear relation to the market-making strategy, HFT traders use
their speed advantage to exploit structural vulnerabilities in the
market. Namely, they trade with market participants through
trading venues that offer transactions at "stale" prices (i.e., prices
that have not yet updated to reflect market changes). 4 2 For example,
an HFT firm can update its quote to 25.06 and simultaneously
attempt to buy from slower market participants at 25.01 (the current
ask price) or 25.02 and profit from the difference. 43
The momentum ignition strategy, a type of directional strategy
similar to order anticipation that incorporates market making,
involves initiating large groups of orders and trades to try to initiate
quick increases or decreases in price. 44 In this way, HFT firms seek
the correct price level, which may benefit the market by helping to
improve price discovery without the need for intermediate executions
that tend to occur during periods of very low cancellation activity.4 5
Some credit HFT firms' price-finding and adapting features for the
lack of frequent market crashes. 46

37.
See id.
38.
Boyan Jovanovic & Albert J. Menkveld, Middlemen in Limit Order Markets
(2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1624329 [https://perma.cc/4QJX-EK9T]
(archived
Nov. 5, 2016).
39.
See id.
40.
See id.
41.

EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 4.

42.
Id. at 13.
43.
Jesse Blocher et al., Phantom Liquidity and High Frequency Quoting 5
(2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2776745&download=yes
[https://perma.cclDM7Z-P5HP] (archived Nov. 5, 2016).
44.

See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 4.

45.
Jesse Blocher et al., supra note 43, at 16.
46.
See id. (arguing against "'crash insurance,' the notion that HFTs abandon
the markets rather than assuming some obligation to endure losses in times of market
stress").
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Traders and Types of Securities Traded

Generally, there are three groups of traders in the marketplace:
(1) longer-term investors, such as institutional or retail investors who
hold their investment positions for longer than one day; (2) low
frequency, intraday traders, such as investment brokers who hold
their investment positions for shorter than one day; and (3) HFT
traders.4 7 However, because no one can agree on one allencompassing definition of HFT, it is difficult to identify who engages
in HFT and which securities HFT traders are trading.
In the United States, HFT is estimated to account for between
approximately 50 and 70 percent of trading volume. 4 8 The level and
nature of HFT activity, however, can vary greatly across different
types of stocks. For example, HFT traders are much more active in
large-capitalization stocks than in small-capitalization stocks, but 69
percent of their small-capitalization stock activity results from
aggressive orders. 49 HFT is also emerging in the trade of other US
securities, including treasuries, bonds, and equity-related futuresHFT accounts for approximately 60 percent of trading volume in the
futures market.5 0
In the European Union, the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) estimates that HFT accounts for somewhere
between 24 and 43 percent of equity value traded, depending on the
method implemented to calculate market share.5 1 Using co-location
as a proxy for HFT activity, HFT firms account for approximately 35
percent of co-location services (compared with investment banks,

47.
See id. at 15.
48.
Compare Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1622 n.57 (50 percent),
with X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery
1-3 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Yale University School of
Management) (70 percent).
49.
Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, High
Frequency Trading and Price Discovery 10-11 (Eur. Cent. Bank Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 1602, 2013), https://www.ecb.europa.eulpub/pdf/sepwps/ecbwpl602.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XU2-8KV9] (archived Nov. 5, 2016); see also EQUITY MARKET
STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 13 (finding that HFTs are less active

in mid-capitalization and small-capitalization stocks).
50.

See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 6.

To see how HFT is also emerging in the bitcoin market, see Bloomberg News, HighSpeed Traders Are Taking Over Bitcoin, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 17, 2017 4:21 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-16/high-speed-traders-are-taking-

over-bitcoin-as-easy-money-beckons
2017).

[https://perma.cc/5H9A-M3CX] (archived Jan. 17,

51.
See EUR. SEC. AND MKTS. AUTH. [hereinafter ESMA], EcoNOMIC REPORT:
HIGH-FREQUENCY
TRADING ACTIVITY
IN
EU
EQUITY MARKETS
11
(2014),

https://www.esma.europa.eulsites/default/files/library/2015/11/esma20141_hftactivity-ineu-equitymarkets.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVD6-DPYF] (archived Nov.
5, 2016) (explaining the direct and lifetime of orders methods for calculating HFT
market share in the European Union).
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which account for 44 percent). 2 Furthermore, when. parsed into
market share by the numbers of trades and orders, all methods of
calculation yielded a trend: HFT market share by value traded was
smaller than HFT share by number of trades, which in turn was
smaller than HFT share by number of orders.5 3 Therefore, because
the HFT market share is smaller than non-HFT market share, and
the order-to-trade ratio of HFTs is on average higher than the orderto-trade ratio of non-HFTs, HFT traders execute fewer trades per
order than non-HFT traders. This finding is consistent with HFT's
noted high volume characteristic, one of the few that the United
States and the European Union regularly acknowledge.

III. PROMINENCE: HOW DOES HET IMPACT MARKETS?

The desire for speed and competitive advantage is a recurring
theme in financial markets and the modern information environment.
Globalization, the internet, and social media grant amateur investors
and ordinary citizens access to twenty-four-hour news, computerized
trading platforms, and 401(k) investment decision making. 54 HFT
capitalizes on this increasing dynamism, but the question remains as
to whether resulting gains in efficiency trump the proposed
"decoupling of predictability and profitability" in the market.5 5
A.

Benefits of HFT

While the aforementioned benefits of individual strategies are
important considerations for HFT firms in evaluating investment
options, regulators must analyze HFT's effect on the marketplace as a
general practice.
One significant benefit of HFT is that it limits holding risk, or
the risk an investor incurs by holding an investment in the market
for a long period of time. The average holding period in the United

52.
share).
53.

Id. at 13 (implementing the direct method for calculating HFT market
See id. at 11.

54.
See HOLLY A. BELL, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 731 HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING,
Do REGULATORS NEED TO CONTROL THIS TOOL OF INFORMATIONALLY EFFICIENT
MARKETS?,
CATO
INSTITUTE
3-4
(2013),

https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa731_web_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U99T-RA9E] (archived Jan. 15, 2017) (evaluating to what extent HFT
should be regulated).
55.
Clive Jones, High Frequency Trading and the Efficient Market Hypothesis,
BUS. FORECAST BLOG (Jan. 29, 2015), http://businessforecastblog.com/high-frequencytrading-and-the-efficient-market-hypothesis/ [https://perma.cc/8MC5-B23W] (archived
Jan. 15, 2017).
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States for stocks has been quoted at twenty-two seconds. 56 Because
HFT firms can quickly enter or exit the market, they do not need to
"invest deeply in understanding the longer-term behavior of
securities" or to provide for risk by holding large amounts of capital.5 7
Thus, HFT firms do not carry significant, unhedged positions from
trading day to trading day.5 8
As a direct result, more nontraditional, specialized trading firms
have gained access to the market.5 9 The stock market crash of 1987
saw the rise of the "Automated Trading Desk" on the notion that
computers could automate the function of market makers trading
stocks on their clients' behalf.6 0 Since then, specialized HFT firms
like Global Electronic Trading Co. (Getco), Tradeworx, Tradebot
Systems, Tower Research Capital, and RGM Advisors have increased
their market share on the premise of "providing multiple benefits to
everyday investors." 6 1
Indeed, critics can distort the prospect of benefits to the client by
focusing solely on the benefits HFT firms themselves receive.
Financial markets continue to be busy, and poor results are usually
interpreted as long term ramifications of the 2008 crisis, rather than
of HFT activity. 62 HFT can use its role in market making to provide
investors with more efficient access to markets at a lower costC
through competitive advantage and greater liquidity. 63 As
Bloomberg's Matt Levine stipulates, "The basic raison d'6tre of highfrequency trading is that it makes markets more efficient . . . . It's
also about efficiently extracting value from amateur . . . traders and

56.
seconds,

Paul Farrow, How Long Does the Average Share Holding Last? Just 22
THE

TELEGRAPH

(Jan.

18,

2012),

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/9021946/How-long-doesthe-average-share-holding-last-Just-22-seconds.html
[https://perma.cc/3M4L-G3DY]
(archived Jan. 15, 2017).
57.
Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1624.
58.
See Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 17
C.F.R. 242 (Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-61358.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QVE-J9HE] (archived June 10, 2017) (reviewing the current equity
market structure).
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1624.
59.
60.
See Scott Patterson, Man vs. Machine: Seven Major Players in HighFrequency Trading, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.cnbc.comlid/39038892
[https://perma.cc/PH7D-XVWUI (discussing the evolution of specialized HFT firms in
the aftermath of the crash of Black Monday, 1987).
61.

See id. (noting Tradeworx founder Manoj Narang's estimate that trading in

Tradeworx's HFT system [approximately $10 million in capital] accounts for 3 percent
of daily volume in Spiders [S&P 500 ETF]).
62.
See Gianluca Virgilio, High-Frequency Trading and the Efficient Market
at
79
(2015),
MGMT. REV.,
no.
3,
Hypothesis, 6
THE Bus. AND
http://www.abrmr.com/myfile/conference-proceedings/ConPro_42356/2015rogelO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VVJ-7TWC] (archived Jan. 15, 2017) (examining the impact of HFT
on the Efficient Market Hypothesis).
63.
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1628.
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giving it to professionals." 64 These considerations place HFT in the
middle of a larger debate in modern markets over efficiency versus
distributional effects.
Even then, while individual investors do not have access to the
milliseconds' worth of information that HFT firms secure through
algorithms, retail investors in contemporary markets have access to
far more information than they did in the 1990s. 65 Furthermore,
researchers have found that HFT reduces bid-ask spreads, or the
differential between the highest price a buyer is willing to pay for an
asset (bid price) and the lowest price for which a seller is willing to
sell the asset (ask price). 66 Thus, investors can more cheaply and
easily enter and exit the marketplace, catalyzing a more efficient
67
capital allocation across the economy.

B.

Costs of HFT

1. Competitive Advantage
HFT's drive for competitive advantage produces many of the
costs attributable to HFT. The economic costs of creating HFT
algorithms to execute trades, and then of integrating those
algorithms into investment practice, can provide a significant barrier
to market entry. HFT requires good programming, which can create
an intellectual property rights issue for a programmer who wishes to
market his or her algorithm, as well as for a competitive HFT firm
that wishes to maintain competitive advantage.
That competitive advantage can force exit from the market,
because it transfers costs to informed traditional traders and alters
their incentives. As mentioned in Part III.A, HFT firms' ability to
quickly enter into or exit from the market diminishes their need to
thus,
more
behavior
of
securities;
understand
long-term
68
nontraditional trading firms have gained access to the market.
While this is an economic "win" for HFTs looking for low-stake
investment opportunities, traditional informed traders rely on
research and experience regarding long-term behavior of securities as

64.
Matt Levine, Snap Votes and Banker Bonuses, MONEY STUFF, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Jan. 17, 2017, 9:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-0117/snap-votes-and-banker-bonuses [https://perma.cc/NNY8-SPXH] (archived Jan. 17,
2017).
65.
See BELL, supranote 54, at 4.
66.
See generally Terrence Hendershott, Charles M. Jones & Albert J.
Menkveld, Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, 66 J. OF FIN. (2011),
[https://perma.cc/ASF8-C43S]
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hender/algo.pdf
(archived Jan. 20, 2017) (finding that algorithmic trading narrows bid-ask spreads,
reduces trade-related price discovery, and improves liquidity).
67.
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1646-47.
68.
See id. at 1624 (describing that by entering and exiting the market quickly
they only need to anticipate very recent trends).
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their competitive advantage. When speed-minded HFT traders use
order-anticipation strategies to anticipate traditional trades,
informed traders receive diminished marginal returns from their
research such that investment in information is no longer practical
from a business standpoint.69
Yet in the wake of financial crisis, the SEC and the CFTC set the
bar high for "robust, accessible, and timely market data."70 Put
simply:
So how do traders compete in a marketplace full of computers? The answer,
ironically enough, is to not compete. Unless you are prepared to pay for a low
latency feed and write software to react to market movements on the

millisecond timescale, you simply will not win. . . . [T]he required reaction time
is on the order of 10 milliseconds. You could be the fastest human trader in the
world chasing that spike, but 100% of the time, the computer will beat you to
it.71

As a result, some critics of HFT fear that an increase in algorithmic
trading will lead to a two-tiered market system, with large HFT
traders on one tier and more traditional traders and investors on
another. 72 However, this trade-off is complex, and traditional,.,
informed traders benefit from the immediate liquidity and smaller
bid-ask spreads HFT provides.
The sheer number of trading exchanges in the United States and
the European Union adds to the information cost as well as the
economic cost.73 Algorithms must be capable of independently
interpreting news from multiple sources (i.e., social media, news
broadcasts, and regulatory reports), in addition to the exchanges
themselves, for buzz words that might impact the market.7 4

69.
See id. at 1615. ("By free-riding on the intelligence of others, algorithmic
traders save themselves time and money while also taking home a share of the
winnings.").
70.
STAFFS OF THE OFTC AND SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE EVENTS OF MAY

6, 2010, at 45 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2FY5-NVDH] (archived Nov. 6, 2016) ("Whether trading decisions are
based on human judgment or a computer algorithm, and whether trades occur once a
minute or thousands of times each second, fair and orderly markets require that the
standard for robust, accessible, and timely market data be set quite high.").
71.
72.

See Jones, supra note 55.
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 54, at 4.

73.
In the United States, exchanges include: NYSE, Nasdaq, American
Exchange [AMEX], Boston Stock Exchange [BSE], Chicago Exchange [CHX],
Philadelphia Stock Exchange [PSE]; in the European Union, exchanges include
Euronext, Frankfurt Exchange [DAX], Italian Exchange [FTSE MIB], Swiss Exchange
[SIX], Stockholm Exchange [STO], Norex, Spanish Exchange [IBEX]. See, e.g., Norman
S.

Poser,

The

Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation,

Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 497, 500-07 (2014)
(naming NYSE and Nasdaq in the United States and Euronext, Frankfurt Exchange
[DAX], Italian Exchange [FTSE MIB], Swiss Exchange [SIX], and Stockholm Exchange
[STO] in the European Union).
74.
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1624.
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Beyond the new incentive against research on long-term
securities behavior, information that could potentially impact the
market can be lost in translation because HFT puts a premium on
speed. Thus, HFT may increase the amount of information in the
markets but decrease the amount of useful information in the
markets.7 5 Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz described
as "socially wasteful" the effort necessary to separate the valuable
information from the useless information, resulting in a harmful "loss
of confidence in markets." 76
Critics often cite that useless information, or "market noise," as a
cost of HFT. Noise exists when there is competing or contradicting
information in the market or when the amount of information
becomes too great for the market to process, harming market
integrity.7 7 HFT firms create noise as algorithms implement
"pinging" (see Part II.B) to ignite market momentum, a method some
argue should be regulated.7 8
2. Model Risk
Model risk arises from a dependence on pre-set algorithmic
programming to address the logistical challenge of real-time
intervention.7 9 In her work on algorithms that undermine capital
market efficiency, Professor Yesha Yadav describes a clash here as
the "Goldilocks Dilemma"-"For models to work optimally, market
conditions should be exactly attuned to their assumptions and
projections." 80 Studies suggest that HFT traders transacting in the
direction of permanent price changes best predict price changes over
horizons of three to four seconds.8 1 While some claim HFT firms'
price-finding and adapting features decrease the chance of frequently
occurring market crashes (see Part II.C), others argue that HFT
predictions and trades during times of financial stress are not
I
reliable. 82
The Flash Crash of 2010 provides an excellent stage for this
controversy. On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell
by almost one thousand points, the largest one-day decline in broad

Felix Salmon, The Problems of HFT, Joe Stiglitz edition, REUTERS BLOG
75.
(Apr. 16, 2014), http:/fblogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2014/04/15/the-problems-of-hftjoe-stiglitz-edition/ [https://perma.cc/AYJ3-DFAW] (archived Jan. 15, 2017).
76.
Id.
77.
See BELL, supranote 54, at 8.
78.
See id.
79.

See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 17, at 1613.

Id.
80.
See id. at 1614.
81.
82.
See Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in
Financial Markets (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing
market stress may lead to stress spreading quickly).
4
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market prices in its history, but it quickly rebounded.8 3 According to
an SEC-CFTC report, HFT traders did not initiate the crash but
exacerbated the liquidity issue during freefall. 84 HFT firms continued
to trade at high levels, in the aggregate representing 50.3 percent of
total volume at exchanges and other venues and selling $1.34 billion
of value.8 5 Then, during the price rebound, HFTs in the aggregate
represented only 36.6 percent of total volume. 86 HFT traders faced
censure for reportedly fleeing the market in large numbers to save
themselves from the stress of the crisis rather than staying to ensure
liquidity, which exacerbated market volatility.8 7 This is consistent
with the notion that HFT can exaggerate price reaction and increase
stock price volatility, possibly because of model risk.8 8
3. Macroeconomics
Faster is not always better. HFT market making might not
actually improve price discovery in terms of net gains to society. Some
critics stipulate that any macroeconomic benefit yielded by faster
price discovery cannot compare with the high costs associated with
the few extra milliseconds provided. In particular, the resulting
higher market volatility negatively affects welfare, the structure of
the economy, and overall economic performance.8 9
Private actors like HFT firms are too narrowly focused to
consider large scale public goods and gains. To HFT firms, time is
relative; they gain from the competitive advantage of outpacing other
HFT firms and traditional traders. Because ultra-fast is not equally
accessible to all, Gianluca Virgilio of the University of Hertfordshire
asserts, HFT is the chief reason for technology-led market
inefficiency.9 0 The information asymmetry on which HFT firms profit

83.
David Easley et al., The Microstructureof the Flash Crash, 37 J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 118, 118-19 (2011) (explaining two liquidity crises that followed the crash).
84.
See STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, supra note 70, at 45.
85.

EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 11.

86.

Id. For more information on HFT activity in the U.S. Treasury market in

October 2010, see STAFFS OF THE U.S. TREASURY ET AL., JOINT STAFF REPORT: THE U.S.

TREASURY MARKET ON OCTOBER 15, 2014, 4-6 (Jul. 13, 2015) (noting HFT firms
accounted for the largest share in liquidity-removing trades).
87.
See Easley et al., supra note 83 ("This generalized severe mismatch in
liquidity was exacerbated by the withdrawal of liquidity by some electronic market
makers and by uncertainty about, or delays in, market data affecting the actions of
market participants"). But see Jesse Blocher et al., supra note 43, at 16 (arguing
against "'crash insurance,' the notion that HFTs abandon the markets rather than
assuming some obligation to endure losses in times of market stress").
88.
See Zhang, supra note 48, at 3.
89.
See Salmon, supra note 75; see also Virgilio, supra note 62, at 80
("Certainly, HF traders speed up price discovery - but at their own benefit and to the
detriment of the many other slower investors, that is, to the detriment of the market at
large.").
90.
Virgilio, supra note 62, at 72.
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yields a large redistributive effect; considering the transaction cost of
gathering information and a lack of any tangible social benefit, there
is a net social cost.9 1

IV. REGULATION: How

A.

CAN REGULATORS CONTROL

HFT?

Purpose of Regulation

Beyond the ongoing debate over the definition and the overall
market impact of HFT, regulators face controversy over their role in
the markets in relation to HFT. The baseline question-Is there even
a need for regulation?-is complex. The desire for market
intervention to prevent unfairness, volatility, and informational
asymmetries is not new, and it is certainly not specific to HFT. Purely
as a matter of systemic risk, regulation cannot remove all the
uncertainty in the market. Software may help traders to make more
informed decisions and to diversify risk more rationally, but it will
never alone guarantee risk-free return. 92
1. Competition in the Market
Some argue that intervention could prevent such problems from
resolving themselves through market mechanisms, harkening to
classic laissez-faire economic theory and Friedrich Hayek's theory
that markets are the most efficient way of aggregating information
dispersed among individuals within a society.93 Perhaps increased
competition in the HFT industry breeds increased efficiency.9 4
Holly Bell of the Cato Institute indicated that as HFT has
increased in market share, it has become more commonly understood
and less effective.9 5 Because HFT firms are developing new
algorithms to separate HFT-related market noise from actual market
news, their ability to ignite major, unfounded market swings weakens
as they become better consumers of the market information created

91.
See Salmon, supra note 75.
92.
See Virgilio, supra note 62, at 79.
93.
Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REV., No.
4, 519-21 (1945), http://www.kysq.org/does/Hayek_45.pdf [https://perma.ccl6TAC-S26Y]
(archived Jan. 16, 2017).
See Virgilio, supra note 62, at 79 (quoting FORESIGHT, THE FUTURE OF
94.
COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL
GOVERNMENT
OFFICE
FOR

MARKETS,
SCIENCE,

FINAL

PROJECT
LONDON,

REPORT,
at

THE
54,

http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/tacfuturecomputertradi
ng1012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z6H-23M2] (archived Jan. 16, 2017) (asserting "the more
competitive the HFT industry, the more efficient will be the market in which they
work").

95.

BELL, supra note 54, at 8.
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by other algorithms. 9 6 As such, Bell concludes that regulators adopt
"appropriate restraint" by leaving the control of those who exploit
algorithms through misinformation to the competitive market.9 7
Institutionally, regulators can improve the technology they use
to monitor markets for purportedly illegal activity without needing to
heighten regulation of HFT:
The key issue for regulators is to be careful to distinguish between
inappropriate uses of a technology (such as order ignition, intentional quote
stuffing, wash trades, and other manipulative practices) and the technology
itself.... [D]eveloping additional regulatory requirements that restrict the
activities of all high frequency traders will likely create market distortions and
disrupt the efficient movement of market information, liquidity, and short-term
price stability. This is likely to be more damaging to the market than HFT98
induced noise.

In light of this proposed lessening impact of HFT, one might question
the value of regulation at this stage. If Bell is correct, HFT may soon
reach its maximum market velocity.9 9 From a marginal costmarginal benefit analysis standpoint, the marginal cost of the
algorithms HFT firms use to exploit ever-smaller time gaps could
outpace the marginal benefit those algorithms and associated time
gaps produce. 10 0
Even if there is a need for regulation, the purpose of the
regulation-to incentivize, alter, or curb HFT-is still unclear, as it
reflects a judgment, positive or negative, on HFT practices.
2. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
HFT's defiance of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
(ECMH) indicates why accountability through market competition
alone might not sufficiently address volatility and inequity concerns.
The ECMH draws on the concept of controlling fluctuation through
competitive market normalization.
Eugene Fama and Paul Samuelson developed the ECMH to
reflect the theory that markets follow a "random walk," or that prices
fluctuate randomly.10 1 In essence, the ECMH states that the market

96.
Id.
Id.
97.
Id. at 9.
98.
99.
See id. at 3-4 (describing the two-tiered market system, volatility, flash
crashes, market liquidity, noise and market integrity are evidence HFT may reach
maximum market velocity).

100.
See id.
101.
See Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. OF BUS. 34,
36 (1965), http://www.e-m-h.org/Fama65.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMH6-6JBFI (archived
Jan. 16, 2017) (establishing the random walk hypothesis); see also Paul A. Samuelson,
Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41,
42
(1965),
http://lib.cufe.edu.cn/upload-files/file/20140522/3_20140522_4.Proof%
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price of an actively traded security will incorporate some amount of
information related to that security.1 02 Fama divided the ECMH into
three forms-strong ECMH, semi-strong ECMH, and weak ECMHwhich differ in the amount of information reflected in the prices of
actively traded securities. 0 3 In strong ECMH (the most expansive),
prices reflect all past and present information, privately and publicly
available. 0 4 In semi-strong ECMH (the most applicable to modern
markets), prices only reflect all publicly available information. 0 5 In
weak ECMH (the most restrictive), prices only reflect past
information.1 0 6
The ECMH posits that prices encompass market information
such that no one can consistently make profits above the market
average (i.e., greater than those achievable with a buy-and-hold
strategy). 0 7 Whenever securities pricing becomes inefficient, rational
investors will engage in arbitrage to realign prices to their
fundamental value.' 0 Any profit resulting from that arbitrage is
shared among many competing market players and averages to zero
over time. 0 9
HFT casts doubt on the ECMH. In contrast to the EMCH,
Virgilio concluded that a small number of HFT firms could achieve
risk-free returns consistently by extracting most of the gains from
arbitrage rather than allowing them to efficiently spread among the
greater investor pool. 1 ' 0 HFT thus allows a limited number of traders
to "beat the market" by exploiting the time advantage accrued
through use of algorithms, faster networks, and co-location. Typically,
traditional retail and individual investors do not have the
information and skill to engage in arbitrage opportunities. i

20that%2OProperly%2OAnticipated%2OPrices%20Fluctuate%2ORandomly.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SV8-YTXG] (archived Jan. 16, 2017) (providing a proof for Fama's
random walk hypothesis).
102.
STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND

ANALYSIS 30 (4th ed. 2015).
103.
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical
Work,
25
J.
OF
FIN.,
No.
2,
at
383
(1970),
http://efinance.org.cn/cn/fm/Efficient%2Capital%2Markets%20A%20Review%20of%2
OTheory%20and%2OEmpirical%2OWork.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXZ7-M44B] (archived
Jan. 16, 2017).
104.
Virgilio, supra note 62, at 69.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
See id. at 69, 71.
108.
See id. at 69, 73.
109.
See Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, supra note 100; see also
Gianluca Virgilio, High-frequency trading and the efficient market hypothesis, 6 THE
REV.
73
(2015),
AND
MGMT.
Bus.
http://www.abrmr.com/myfile/conference-proceedings/ConPro_42356/2015rogel0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VVJ-7TWC] (archived Jan. 15, 2017).
110.
See Virgilio, supra note 62, at 80.
111.
Cf. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. OF
36-37
(1997),
http://ms.mcmaster.ca/-grassellilShleiferVishny97.pdf
FIN.
35,
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Professor Adam Clark-Joseph analyzed CFTC audit-level trading
data in the eMini S&P 500 futures market and proposes that HFT
aggressive orders generate valuable private information:
When an HFT places an exploratory order and observes a large price-impact,
he learns that supply is temporarily inelastic. If the HFT knows that there is
going to be more demand soon thereafter, he can place a larger order (even with
a big price-impact) knowing that the price-impact from the coming demand will
drive prices up further and ultimately enable him to sell at a premium that
exceeds the price-impact of his unwinding order. When an HFT knows that
supply is temporarily inelastic, he follows a routine demand-anticipation
strategy. The purpose of exploratory trading is not to learn about future
demand, but rather to identify the times at which trading in front of future
112
demand will be profitable.

As a result, only a relatively small number of professional, highly
specialized HFT investors can outmaneuver traditional investors, and
ECMH's assumption that no one can consistently beat the market no
longer holds.1 13
Virgilio created a simple arbitrage model to this effect,
demonstrating that HFT firms can make statistically significant
profits. 114 Thus, while smart software might never nullify trading
risk, only HFT speed and co-location seem to provide the possibility of
risk-free return.1 15
ECMH and guaranteeing
defying the
Consequently, regulation may be necessary to address this inequity.
B.

Efforts in the United States

The SEC, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
and the CFTC are the regulatory authorities leading the charge
against HFT in the United States. Through recent regulatory
proposals and enforcement actions, these institutions have taken
steps to bring HFT under closer scrutiny.

[https://perma.cc/5ZVD-9MCF] (archived Jan. 16, 2017) (noting that "millions of little
traders are typically not the ones who have the knowledge and information to engage
in arbitrage").
112.
ADAM
CLARK-JOSEPH,
EXPLORATORY
TRADING
4
(2013),
http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4136/exploratorytrading.pdf [https://perma.cclLLQ8-7FZY]
(archived June 10, 2017).
113.
See Virgilio, supra note 62, at 69. But see Kewei Hou, Chen Xue & Lu
Zhang, Replicating Anomalies 31 (Fisher College of Business Working Paper Series,
Paper
No.
2017-03-010,
2017),
[https://perma.cc/Q3MINhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2961979
ZCXZ] (archived June 10, 2017) (stipulating that because true "anomalies," or patterns
that make stock prices predictable, are much less prevalent than reported, capital
markets are more efficient than previously realized).
114.
See Virgilio, supra note 62, at 76-79 (providing a model representing two
markets, with a large number of traditional investors and a small number of HFT
investors trading the same securities, to show how HFT investors can make consistent,
abnormal, risk-free profit at traditional investors' expense).
115.
See id. at 79.
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1. The SEC and Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity
The SEC adopted Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity
(Reg SCI) in November 2014 in hopes of strengthening the technology
infrastructure of US securities markets. In implementing this set of
rules, the SEC expressly sought to "[r]educe the occurrence of
systems issues; [i]mprove resiliency when systems problems do occur;
and [e]nhance the Commission's oversight and enforcement of
securities market technology infrastructure."' 16 These ambitions
represent the typical counterargument to critics' contention that
regulation interferes with the competitive market's ability to resolve
problems (see Part IV.A.1)-regulation could help prevent such
problems from occurring in the first place.
Reg SCI applies to "SCI entities"-(1) self-regulatory
organizations, such as stock and options exchanges, registered
clearing agencies, FINRA, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board (MSRB), that trade stocks exceeding specified volume
thresholds; (2) consolidated market data processors; (3) certain
exempt clearing agencies; and (4) alternative trading systems (ATSs)
that exceed volume thresholds. SCI entities that support "SCI
systems"-trading, market data processing, market regulation,
market surveillance, clearance and settlement, and order routingare the specific target. SCI entities must establish written policies
and procedures to ensure their technological systems "promote
maintenance of fair and orderly markets" and comply with the U.S.
Securities Exchange Act of

1 9 3 4 .117

More pertinent to HFT, Reg SCI requires SCI entities to
mandate participation in testing of business continuity and disaster
recovery plans. Among other things, this stipulation reflects the
possibility of flash crashes, noting that SCI entities must take
corrective action and disseminate information with respect to "SCI
events"-systems disruptions, systems compliance problems, and
systems intrusions.ns In the final rule, the SEC noted that while
recent technological advances have "substantially enhanced the
speed, capacity, efficiency, and sophistication of the trading
functions," they have increased the risk of operational problems
associated with automated systems, which can have widespread and
lasting effects. 1i 9 To enhance accountability on this front, SCI entities
must also establish procedures to identify and periodically review
"SCI personnel," or those responsible for SCI systems.

116.

See SEC SPOTLIGHT: REGULATION SCI, supra note 8.

See Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Final rule and form, 17
117.
C.F.R. §§ 240, 242, 249 (2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-05/pdf/201427767.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BM6-FZV3] (archived Mar. 1, 2017); see also 15 U.S.C. §
78(f)(b)(1) (2012).
118.
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, supranote 117.
119.

Id.
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Reviews of Reg SCI are generally positive, seeing the
requirements as a step in the right direction for regulators in light of
growing cybersecurity concerns. 120 SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar
highlighted Reg SCI's strengths, including its risk-based (and not
overly prescriptive) approach and its requirement that companies'
senior management and boards of directors be actively involved in
cybersecurity issues.1 2 1 Commissioner Aguilar also commended the
regulation's emphasis on information sharing with other industry
participants, noting how increased awareness could reduce cyber risk
and enhance recovery responses.1 22
If anything, Reg SCI is not enough. The Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) believes regulations like Reg
SCI are too limited. While noting the importance of issue prevention,
SIFMA emphasizes containment and minimization of such problems
to prevent the aforementioned lasting effects of automated system
problems.1 23 Referencing the 2010 Flash Crash (see Part II.B.2),
SIFMA notes additional mechanisms to protect individual investors'
confidence in technological advancements. Specifically, it proposes a
hybrid approach:
a price band in order to prevent trades from occurring outside acceptable predetermined price ranges, a bid/offer wanted period to alert market participants
to the need for additional liquidity within the acceptable price range to avoid
unnecessary price swings, and trading halt to pause trading when necessary to
promote proper price discovery.

124

Indeed, the SEC has already indicated that it may expand the scope
of Reg SCI in light of all market participants' increased use of
automated technologies. 125 Commissioner Aguilar expressed a need

120.
CYBER ATTACKS: THREATS, REGULATORY REACTION AND PRACTICAL
PROACTIVE MEASURES TO HELP AVOID RISKS, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP (June

24, 2015),
https://www.kattenlaw.com/Cyber-Attacks-Threats-Regulatory-Reaction[https://perma.cc/X47Z-GE2F]
and-Practical-Proactive-Measures-to-Help-Avoid-Risks
(archived Mar. 1, 2017).
121.
Stephen Joyce, SEC's Reg SCI Should Encompass More Market
BNA
(June
26,
2015),
Says,
BLOOMBERG
Participants, Aguilar
[https://perma.cc/NB5G-P8CE]
https://www.bna.com/secs-reg-sci-nl7179928830/
(archived Mar. 1, 2017).
122.
Id.
123.
SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS ASSoc. [hereinafter SIFMA], REG SCI
RESOURCE

CENTER,

http://www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/equity-markets/reg-

sciloverview/ [https://perma.ccl9AR4-89NE] (archived Mar. 1, 2017).
124.

SIFMA,

FLASH

CRASH

RESOURCE

CENTER,

http://www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/equity-markets/flash-crash/overview/
[https://perma.cc/HEX4-3XFF] (archived Mar. 1, 2017).
125.
Annette L. Nazareth et al., SEC Adopts Regulation SCI to Strengthen
Securities Market Infrastructure, DAVIS POLK CLIENT MEMORANDUM

(Dec. 4, 2014),

https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/12.04.14%20SEC%2OAdopts%2ORegulatio
[https://perma.cclKSX6n%20SCI%20to%2Strengthen%2OSecurities%2OMarket.pdf
ZGC6] (archived Mar. 1, 2017).
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for a more comprehensive list of market participants, like over-thecounter market makers and transfer agents. 126
2. The SEC, FINRA, and Enforcement
The SEC has sought to enforce its regulations in favor of greater
disclosure to unpack the "mystery" of HFT. For example, in October
2014 the SEC sanctioned HFT firm Athena Capital Research LLC for
executing a large number of aggressive trades in quick succession at
market closing, a practice known as "marking the close," on almost
every trading day for six months. 127 According to the SEC, Athena
knowingly used an algorithm, codenamed "Gravy," to create an order
imbalance in which the number of orders to buy certain shares did
not match the number of offers to sell those shares. 128
While Athena neither admitted nor denied the SEC's charge for
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5, it agreed to pay a $1 million penalty and to cease
and desist from committing or causing any future violations of the
securities laws. 129 SEC Chair Mary Jo White asserted, "When [HFT
firms] cross the line and engage in fraud we will pursue them as we
do with anyone who manipulates the markets."13 0 Deeming Athena's
activity fraudulent, SEC Division of Enforcement Director Andrew J.
Ceresney added, "This action should send a clear message that the
[SEC] and its Division of Enforcement have the expertise to
investigate and charge even the most sophisticated fraudulent
algorithmic trading strategies."'13
Beyond these enforcement efforts, the SEC oversees FINRA, a
self-regulatory organization that acts as the front-line regulator for
broker-dealers (although most broker-dealers also must register with
the SEC). 13 2 Traders who register with FINRA face disclosure

126.
See Joyce, supra note 121.
127.
Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges New York-Based High Frequency
Trading Firm With Fraudulent Trading to Manipulate Closing Prices (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543184457
[https://perma.cc/PU6P-J28W] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
128.
Id.
129.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012); SEC Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); Press Release, SEC, supra note 127.
130.
Press Release, SEC, supranote 127.
131.
Id. The following year, the SEC charged proprietary trading firm Briargate
Trading LLP and co-founder Eric Oscher with manipulating the markets through
spoofing, or artificially inflating prices of particular stocks (see infra Section IV.B.3).
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Firm and Owner with Manipulative Trading
(Oct.
8,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-236.html
[https://perma.cc/9M8D-HPH9] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
132.
Cf. RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING:
OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 10 (2016),

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44443.pdf [https://perma.ccD4ZX-3KCJ] (archived Jan.
20, 2017) (outlining requirements faced by traders subject to FINRA oversight).
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requirements and examinations of their conduct. 3 3 According to Rule
15b9-1 of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in relevant part,
many HFT firms that trade on exchanges through a third-party
broker-dealer, or that trade on alternative trading systems, may be
exempt from FINRA registration. 134
However, the SEC passed a proposal in 2015 requiring
previously exempt HFT broker-dealers to register with FINRA, and
thus to face FINRA regulatory oversight.1 35 The new, more focused
exemption will only exclude approximately 125 firms from FINRA
registration requirements.13 6 The SEC admitted to targeting HFT
firms with this regulation, hoping to enhance regulatory oversight of
active proprietary trading firms.13 7 Echoing SEC Division of
Enforcement Director Ceresney's comment on the Athena sanction,
SEC Commissioner Aguilar noted that the finalized proposals were
integral to advancing FINRA's trading surveillance program: "This
will ensure that these [HFT firms] can be held responsible for any
potential misconduct."ias
3. The CFTC and "Spoofing"
Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) amended the Commodity
Exchange Act to specifically target HFT, albeit under a different
name.139 The new provision, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C), prohibits "any
trading practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules of a registered
entity that . . . is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to

trade as, 'spoofing' (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the
bid or offer before execution)." 140

133.
See id.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78; SEC Rule 15b9-1, 17
134.
C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1 (2012).
135.
See MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 132.
136.
Jeff Kern & Brian Garrett, SEC Requires FINRA Registration for High
Frequency

Traders,

CORP.

&

SEC.

L.

BLOG

(Mar.

27,

2015),

http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2015/03/sec-requires-finra-registration-forhigh-frequency-traders/ [https://perma.cclZKB8-YJRX] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
137.
Cf. Exemption for Certain Exchange Members, 80 Fed. Reg. 1035 (proposed
Apr. 2, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
138. - Kern & Garrett, supra note 136. In 2016, the SEC enforced its new
regulation against two titans of the banking industry-Credit Suisse and Barclays-for
manipulating investors through "dark pools," private trading platforms in which HFT
firms operate. See MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 132 (discussing the settlement of
SEC claims against Credit Suisse and Barclays for cumulatively more than $150
million).
139.
See Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012) (outlawing "spoofing," a
strategy similar to HFT strategies).
140.
Id. § 6c(a)(5)(C).
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The first US statutory provision to specifically ban "spoofing,"
Section 6c(a)(5)(C) targets HFT order anticipation strategies. 14 1
Because the provision relies on determining intent, however,
enforcement of the spoofing prohibition against speed-driven HFT can
prove challenging. To that end, the CFTC released additional
guidance extrapolating on the intent requirement, specifically that
reckless trading practices alone do not constitute spoofing and that
the CFTC must prove that a trader intended to move the market (i.e.,
HFT market making). 142 As CFTC Director of Enforcement Aitan
Goelman noted, "Spoofing seriously threatens the integrity and
stability of futures markets because it discourages legitimate market
participants from trading. The CFTC is committed to prosecuting this
conduct and is actively cooperating with regulators around the world
in this endeavor." 14 3
Dampening criticism of Section 6c(a)(5)(C)'s unenforceability, the
CFTC has enforced the prohibition in several actions involving HFT
and algorithmic trading. In 2016, Michael Coscia, an HFT trader who
implemented CFTC-flagged algorithmic trading strategies, was
convicted on criminal charges for spoofing and commodities fraud.1 44
The Court in United States v. Coscia specifically determined that the
"intent to cancel" requirement of Section 6c(a)(5)(C) was significant;
therefore, the statutory prohibition was not unconstitutionally
vague. 145 The first defendant in the United States to stand trial
under Dodd-Frank anti-spoofing legislation, Coscia was sentenced to
three years in prison and two years of supervised release for "the use
1 46
of computer algorithms to rig markets in fractions of a second."
The CFTC has also pursued civil charges against manipulation
in futures contracts. In 2015, the CFTC filed a civil complaint against

Id.; see also George S. Canellos, Spoofing in the Derivatives and Securities
141.
Markets, MILBANK (June 15, 2016), http://www.milbank.comlimages/content/2/2/22241/
Spoofing-in-the-Derivatives-and-Securitites-Markets-Nov-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3QT-3DWM] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
142.
See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Antidisruptive Practices
Authority, 78 C.F.R. §§ 31890, 31892, 31896 (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2013-05-28/pdfl2013-12365.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 7B3A-USZF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges Chicago Trader Igor B. Oystacher and
143.
His Proprietary Trading Company, 3 Red Trading LLC, with Spoofing and
Employment of a Manipulative and Deceptive Device while Trading E-Mini S&P 500,
Copper, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and VIX Futures Contracts (Oct. 19, 2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7264-15 [https://perma.cclJJ36-C2WQ]
(archived Jan. 20, 2017).
See U.S. v. Coscia, 100 F.Supp.3d 653, 659 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff'd, 177
144.
F.Supp.3d 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding that the spoofing prohibition was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant involved in HFT).
145.
7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C); U.S. v. Coscia, 100 F.Supp.3d at 659.
146.
Greg Trotter, Trader Michael Coscia 1st in nation to be sentenced under
'anti-spoofing'
law,
CHI.
TRIB.
(July
13,
2016,
4:36
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-spoofing-trial-sentencing-0714-biz20160713-story.html [https://perma.ce/5KTD-TKT6] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
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Igor Oystacher and his proprietary trading company, 3 Red Trading
LLC (3 Red defendants), for spoofing and manipulation while trading
futures contracts on four different futures exchanges: the E-Mini S&P
500 futures contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME);
crude oil and natural gas futures contracts on the New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX); copper futures contracts on the
Commodity Exchange Inc. (COMEX); and the volatility index (VIX)
futures contract on CBOE Futures Exchange (CFE).1 4 7
Citing Coscia, the court in CFTC v. Oystacher found that the 3
Red defendants' trading strategy relied on an unlawful intent to
cancel bids or offers before execution, following the language of
Section 6c(a)(5)(C).1 48 Effectively, the 3 Red defendants had placed
and subsequently cancelled large passive orders, implementing an
HFT market-making tactic that created a false impression of a
growing market for the futures, and allowed the 3 Red defendants to
flip their "buy"/"sell" position to turn a profit.1 4 9
Highlighting international efforts to control the behaviors of
disruptive algorithmic traders, in 2015 the CFTC charged Navinder
Singh Sarao, a UK resident, and Nay Sarao Futures Limited PLC
(Sarao defendants) with unlawfully manipulating, attempting to,
manipulate, and spoofing with regard to E-mini S&P 500 near-month
futures contracts.15 0 In particular, the CFTC alleged that the Sarao
defendants used a "layering algorithm" to follow price movements in
the E-mini S&P 500 index and eventually canceled most of the orders
the algorithm placed, allegedly creating a profit of over $40 million.15 1
The manipulation at the heart of the Sarao charge, however, was
the Sarao defendants' use of the layering algorithm on May 6, 2010the day of the Flash Crash (see Part III.B.2)-during which the Sarao
defendants allegedly applied persistent downward pressure worth
approximately $200 million on the E-mini S&P 500 index price.1 52
According to the CFTC, such manipulation helped destabilize the Emini S&P order book, contributing to the market conditions
surrounding the Flash Crash.' 53
In an assurance of the CFTC's resolve, CFTC Director of
Enforcement Goelman stated, "Protecting the integrity and stability

147.
Press Release, CFTC Charges Chicago Trader Igor B. Oystacher, supra
note 143.
148.
7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C); CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F.Supp.3d 934, 944 (N.D.
Ill. 2016).
Press Release, CFTC Charges Chicago Trader Igor B. Oystacher, supra
149.
note 143.
Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges U.K. Resident Navinder Singh Sarao
150.
and His Company Nay Sarao Futures Limited PLC with Price Manipulation and
Spoofing (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7156-15
[https://perma.cc/8ZLB-72DT] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
151.
Id.
152.
See id.
153.
Id.
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of the U.S. futures markets is critical to ensuring a properly
functioning financial system . . . [and the CFTC] will find and
prosecute manipulators of U.S. futures markets wherever they may
be." 1 5 4
4. The CFTC and Regulation Automated Trading
The CFTC proposed Regulation Automated Trading (Reg AT) in
2015 to update its regulations in light of the emergence and
prominence of electronic trading. 5 5 Part of a series of measures in
response to financial regulators' concerns over market volatility, Reg
AT represents a CFTC effort, in the name of transparency, to enhance
its oversight over "automated trading activities," of which HFT is a
primary example.1 56
In proposing Reg AT, the CFTC listed policy concerns it seeks to
address with the regulation, including risks associated with market
liquidity and market shocks, and sufficient risk mitigation in light of
the high speed of trade execution.' 57 In its 2015 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for Reg AT, the CFTC focused on the algorithmic order
routing, electronic order execution, and self-trade, market-making
mechanisms characteristic of HFT.15 8 Later, in its 2016 Reg AT
Supplemental Proposal (Supplemental Proposal), the CFTC sought to
clarify and structure many of the requirements it originally set forth

in Reg AT.
Among their key requirements, Reg AT and the Supplemental
Proposal impose three major requirements:
(1)
new trader
registration related to algorithmic -trading, (2) new risk control
structure, and (3) algorithmic trading source code preservation.1 59

154.
James Quinn & Gordon Rayner, British man held over 9500bn Wall Street
'flash
crash,'
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Apr.
22,
2015,
10:30
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/1 1553433/British-trader-NaySarao-charged-with-triggering-global-markets-flash-crash-in-2010.html
[https://perma.cc/22HW-8DL7] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
155.
See Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. 78823 (proposed Dec. 17,
2015)
(to
be
codified
at
17
CFR
pts.
1,
38,
40,
170),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroomldocuments/file/federalregisterl 12415.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8F47-FUA2] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (discussing the purpose and
requirements of Reg AT).

156.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1, 180.2 (establishing CFTC authority to prohibit
deceptive financial devices and price manipulation); see also MILLER & SHORTER, supra
note 132 (describing the condition of U.S. Treasury securities in 2014 as a stage for the
proposal of Reg AT).
157.
See Regulation Automated Trading, supra note 155.
158.
Id.
159.
Reg AT and the Supplemental Proposal also require periodic review of
compliance with Reg AT and offer options to facilitate the compliance of AT Persons'
third-party systems. See CFTC, FACT SHEET - SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING
ON
REGULATION
AUTOMATED
TRADING
(2016),

http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/regat-factsheetl
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First, Reg AT and the Supplemental Proposal require the registration
of proprietary algorithmic traders who trade on a "designated
contract market" (DCM) using "direct electronic access"-the practice
of directly entering trades into an exchange's electronic trade
matching system for a fee. 16 0 Direct electronic access essentially
allows certain trading customers to avoid routing trades through
brokers (e.g., Charles Schwab), whereby cutting out a major market
participant.1 6
The Supplemental Proposal institutes a volume-based,
quantitative threshold for determining whether an existing trader is
an algorithmic trader, or "AT person," and whether an algorithmic
trader trading on a DCM via direct electronic access must register as
a New Floor Trader with the CFTC.1 6 2 Such a requirement would
expand the number and types of floor traders required to register
with the

CFTC.1 63 The

suggested volume

threshold

is twenty

thousand contracts on average, per day, over a six-month period.1 64
As a result, the CFTC estimates that 120 people will be classified as
AT Persons, of which fifty would be New Floor Traders and seventy
65
Along with the SEC's FINRA.
would be current registrants.s
registration requirement (see Part IV.B.1), the CFTC's proposed-.
registration requirement in Reg AT and the Supplemental Proposal is_
meant to illuminate the current black box in which HFT operates due
to its speedy trade execution.
Second, the Supplemental Proposal sets forth a two-tier, pretrade risk control structure set at the levels of (1) the AT Person or
"executing" futures commission merchant (FCM) and (2) the DCM.1 66
Under this system, an AT Person could choose to delegate compliance
with risk control requirements to its. FCM (with the FCM's
consent).' 6 7 The two-tier structure would replace the three-tier
structure proposed in Reg AT and expand its risk control
requirements to encompass algorithmic trading and electronic

.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV2K-YTGF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (discussing specific
proposals within the supplemental NPRM on Regulation Automated Trading).
MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 132.
160.
See id. (discussing Reg AT's attempt to regulate direct electronic access).
161.
See FACT SHEET, supra note 159, at 1-2; Athena Yvonne Eastwood et al.,
162.
CFTC Approves Supplemental Proposal for Proposed Regulation AT, NAT'L L. REV.
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/cftc-approves-supplemental(Nov. 7, 2016),
proposal-proposed-regulation [https://perma.cc/R6K9-DY2D] (archived Jan. 20, 2017);
Paul M. Architzel et al., CFTC Revises Proposed Reg AT, WILMERHALE (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179
883173 [https://perma.cc/Z2ZS-KBPX] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
See Eastwood et al., supra note 162.
163.
164.
Architzel et al., supra note 162.
Eastwood et al., supra note 162.
165.
166.
FACT SHEET, supranote 159, at 1-2.
Id.
167.
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trading, including electronic trading at the FCM and DCM levels.1 68
In essence, the new two-tier structure would allow the CFTC to more
closely monitor HFT by imposing risk control requirements at a
greater number of levels in the trading chain.
Third, the Supplemental Proposal requires algorithmic trading
source code to be preserved according to provisions other than the
CFTC's general recordkeeping requirements, and accessible to the
CFTC only via subpoena or CFTC-approved special call.169 This is a
revision of the Reg AT provision that required making source code
available for inspection to the CFTC, which received a great deal of
pushback from traders interested in protecting their intellectual
property.17 0 The Supplemental Provision also provides the CFTC with
access both to records tracking changes to an AT Person's algorithmic
trading source code and to log files recording the activity of an AT
Person's algorithmic trading system. 17
Resistance to Reg AT and the Supplemental Proposal ranges
from criticism of its scope and objectives to attacks on the imbalance
of power it allegedly manifests. One of Reg AT's most outspoken
critics comes from within the CFTC itself; CFTC Commissioner J.
Christopher Giancarlo neatly outlined some of the major concerns
regarding Reg AT and has publicly condemned Reg AT as a "20th
century analog response to the 21st century digital revolution in
trading markets."' 7 2
The Reg AT algorithmic trading source code provision arguably
faces the most criticism. While Reg AT implements industry best
practices and provides flexibility in setting risk controls, many
disagree with Reg AT's granting the CFTC and the Department of
Justice access to algorithmic trading source code without
subpoenas.' 7 3 Noting the lack of specific confidentiality protections

168.
The Reg AT three-tier structure provided controls at the levels of (1) the AT
person, (2) the "clearing member" FCM, and (3) the DCM. See MILLER & SHORTER,
supra note 132, at 9-10 (discussing the expansion of registration requirements to
proprietary traders engaging in algorithmic trading); see also FACT SHEET, supra note
159, at 1 (explaining the expansion of the Reg AT risk control framework to also
encompass electronic trading).
169.
FACT SHEET, supra note 159, at 2.

170.
See id. (describing source code availability requirement).
171.
Id.
172.
Lisa Lambert, U.S. automated trading proposal out of date: CFTC
commissioner,
REUTERS
Bus.
NEWS
(Sept.
21,
2016,
12:14
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-regulation-trading-idUSKCN1 1R256
[https://perma.cc/ 2C2Y-JDRRJ (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
173.
See CFTC, Statement of Dissent by Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo
Regarding Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulation Automated
Trading
(Nov.
4,
2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/giancarlostatement 110416
[https://perma.cc/8QXM-E7YE] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (discussing Commissioner
Giancarlo's many different qualms with Reg AT); see also Lambert, supra note 172
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for source code, Commissioner Giancarlo stated the Supplemental
Proposal would deprive intellectual property owners of due process of
law.174
Critics like Commissioner Giancarlo also fear the regulatory
precedent adopting the algorithmic trading source code provision
would set for other regulators, both domestic and foreign.
Extrapolating from the likelihood that the SEC will implement source
code provisions similar to those in Reg AT, Commissioner Giancarlo
predicted that other US agencies, such as the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Security Agency, and even the Department of
National
Transportation, might seek source codes from Apple, Facebook,
Oracle, and Uber, respectively. 175
Beyond the United States, Reg AT's source code provision could
further empower government-led campaigns to mandate public
disclosure of algorithms used in banking, search engines, and social
networks. 17 6 The SEC bolsters this prospect, noting the impossibility
of tracing orders and trades to HFT firms when relying solely on
information currently made available to the public. 17 7
Even setting aside the algorithmic trading source code provision.
many see Reg AT as a governmental overreach. The FIA, a futures
industry trade group, filed a comment letter with the CFTC
emphasizing that the new regulation would impact far more market
participants than just a small, specific subset of algorithmic trading
firms.' 7 8

The Managed Funds Association,

a hedge fund group,

concurred with the FIA, commenting that Reg AT too broadly
regulates automated trading by unrelated types of market

(reporting on Commissioner Giancarlo's dislike for Reg AT's "broad scope, hazy
objectives, and several significant inconsistencies).
Statement of Dissent by Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo, supra
174.
note 173.
175.
Id.
176.
See, e.g., Eva Dou, U.S., China Discuss Proposed Banking Security Rules,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-banking[https://perma.cc/PME9-EWDX]
regulator-considering-source-code-rules- 1423805889
(archived Jan. 20, 2017) (discussing US-China talks regarding Chinese banking
regulations that could compromise sensitive US intellectual property); BBC News,
Angela Merkel wants Facebook and Google's secrets revealed, BBC TECH. (Oct. 28,

2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37798762 [https://perma.cclJR5Q-CHY4]
(archived Jan. 20, 2017) (describing German Chancellor Merkel's view that algorithms,
when not transparent, can distort public perceptions and narrow the scope of public
information).
177.
See EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 6, at 8-9

("As a result, it is impossible to identify orders and trades as originating from an HFT
account when relying solely on publicly available information.").
178.
Press Release, FIA, FIA comments on CFTC's Proposed Rule on Automated
2016),
http://www.futuresmag.com/2016/03/16/fia-commentsTrading (Mar. 16,
[https://perma.cc/6FD7-UHW8]
cftc%E2%80%99s-proposed-rule-automated-trading
(archived Jan. 20, 2017).
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participants.1 7 9 Commissioner Giancarlo concluded that Reg AT was
''a classic Washington maneuver: force as many businesses as
possible into the regulatory framework so there is someone to
18 0
investigate if something goes wrong."
C.

Efforts in the European Union

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), an
independent EU regulatory agency, oversees securities trading across
all EU member states. Formed in response to the 2008 Financial
Crisis, ESMA identifies potential threats to financial stability and
adopts emergency measures in crisis situations. Through an
amalgamation of efforts by ESMA and the European Commission, the
Regulation on Markets in Financial Instruments, comprised of the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) and the,
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), seeks to
regulate firms and trading venues that engage in algorithmic trading
and/or HFT.

1. MiFID II
The MiFID regulatory package (beginning with MiFID I) has
been a cornerstone of financial market regulation in the European
Union since 2007, seeking* to improve market competitiveness
through the creation of a single investment market and to ensure
harmonized investor protection. To this end, MiFID I established a
series of rules and requirements related to business organization and
conduct, regulated market authorization, regulatory reporting to
avoid market abuse, trade transparency, and instrument admission
into trading.1 8 1
To inform further regulatory efforts, ESMA distributed a
questionnaire on HFT that surveyed trading firms on their strategies,
market access, latency requirements, algorithm development, and
risk management. 1 82 For the purposes of the questionnaire, HFT was
defined as:
[t]rading activities that employ sophisticated, algorithmic technologies to
interpret signals from the market and, in response, implement trading
strategies that generally involve the high frequency generation of orders and a

179.
Gregory Meyer, Industry criticises CFTC'splans for new automated trading
rules, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.ft.comlcontent/d6558728-ebba- 1 1e5-9fcafb0f946fd1f0 [https://perma.cc[M5EM-E8WF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
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[https://perma.cc/2EAM-D7NQ] (archived Mar. 2, 2017).
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low latency transmission of these orders to the market. Related trading
strategies mostly consist of either quasi market making or arbitraging within
very short time horizons. They usually involve the execution of trades on own
account (rather than for a client) and positions usually being closed out at the
83
end of the day.1

Using feedback from these questionnaires, the European Commission
hoped to update regulations to adapt the existing MiFID I framework
to account for growth in HFT and to prevent or ameliorate the effects
of flash crashes. The Commission looked to include HFT under a
larger "automated trading" umbrella definition and to require all
markets to install their own circuit breakers, stress test their
84
platforms, and offer fair and equal access to co-location services.1
In 2014, after more than two years of negotiations, the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted the
Regulation on Markets in Financial Instruments, commonly referred
to as MiFID II and MiFIR. Ultimately scheduled to apply to EU
member states on January 3, 2018, MiFID II represents an ongoing
effort to dampen the effects of HFT.
While MiFID I was primarily a compliance mandate for the
financial industry, MiFID II poses potential problems for revenues,
organizational strategies, and business models.18 5 Using a series of
and
registration
regulation
benchmarks,
definitional
tests,
the
efficiency,
intends
MiFID
II
to
improve
requirements, ESMA
aftermath
of
markets
in
the
of
financial
and
transparency
resilience,

the 2008 Financial Crisis. Under MiFID II, ESMA is developing
numerous draft regulatory technical standards (RTS) and draft
implementing technical standards (ITS) aimed at increasing the
scope of regulation. In particular, the new regulations will cover more
non-equity products-namely structured deposits issued or sold by
credit institutions, certain packaged retail investment products, and
financial instruments issued by investment firms-and over-thecounter trading.1 86
The April 2016 Delegated Regulation supplementing MiFID II
specifically targets algorithmic trading and its subset, HFT, setting
forth standards for what qualifies as HFT similar to those adopted by

the U.S.

SEC and CFTC. MiFID II characterizes HFT as an

algorithmic trading technique whose infrastructure minimizes
latency through co-location, proximity, or high-speed direct electronic
access, and fosters order initiation, generation, routing, or execution

183.
Id.
184.
See id.
See Benjamin Collette et al., From MiFID I to MiFID II, what are the main
185.
changes?, DELOITTE (May 2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/
[https://perma.cc/2W6Z-AZL8]
lulDocuments/financial-services/IM/mifidii-changes.pdf
(archived Mar. 1, 2017).
186.
See ESMA, supra note 181; Collette et al., supra note 185.
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without human intervention.1 8 7 The Delegated Regulation clarified
the "high message intraday rates" stipulation of the MiFID II
definition to include the submission on average of: (1) at least two
messages per second per any single financial instrument traded on a
trading venue; or (2) at least four messages per second for all
financial instruments traded on a trading venue.1 88 Under MiFID II,
HFT firms must notify regulators that they are engaging in HFT and
on which trading venue(s) they are trading.
The MiFID II technical standards stipulate a variety of
requirements pertinent to HFT, flash crash consequences, and
transparency concerns. For example, the standards specifically
govern HFT by imposing a strict set of organizational requirements
on investment firms and trading venues.18 9 In order to increase
competition, the standards also prohibit discriminatory access to
central counterparties (CCPs), trading venues, and benchmarks. The
standards introduce a trading obligation for shares and certain
derivatives to be traded only on regulated platforms, limiting overthe-counter activity. More broadly, they institute tests to determine
whether a non-financial firm's speculative investment activities are
so great that it should be subject to MiFID II. The technical
standards seek to promote transparency surrounding HFT,
mandating disaggregated data from trading venues, liquidity
assessments for non-equity instruments, volume cap devices and
thresholds for pre- and post-trade transparency regimes, and
disclosure to strengthen the best execution regime, among other
things. 190
2. Reactions to MiFID II
One of the primary criticisms of MiFID II involves the speed of
its implementation timeline. While the process was initiated in 2014,
the actual implementation date within EU member states, January 3,
2018, is subject to several choke points for delay. Given the growth of
HFT, time is arguably of the essence. As a product of the slower pace,
however, trading venues and regulators have more time to engage in
active dialogue and to guarantee fair representation among those
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(archived Mar. 2, 2017) (providing guidance on reporting requirements under MiFID
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most immediately affected by MiFID II. The Electronic Debt Markets
Association Europe (EDMA Europe) is a lobby group composed of
fixed fixed-income trading venues seeking such representation,
looking to ensure open access, fair electronic trading protocols, and
equivalent regulatory treatment of all electronic trading platforms.' 9 1
Critics also question whether MiFID II will achieve its desired
transparency without dire cost. Recall from Part III.B.2 that because
HFT firms can quickly enter or exit the market, they have less of a
need to understand the long-term behavior of securities. More
traditional traders who rely on research and experience for their
competitive advantage suffer diminished marginal returns, and
investment in information is no longer practical from a business
standpoint. MiFID II might contribute to this widening gap between
HFT and more traditional trading.
Under the new regulations, "fund managers cannot receive free
investment research from a broker unless it falls within narrow
exceptions."1 92 Equity managers generally must pay for most of their
research anyway, and HFT traders do not desperately need the
information in the first place. However, this restriction will more
seriously affect bond managers in the European Union, as under
MiFID II they will have to pay brokers both the bid/offer spread and
additional

specific research

costs. 1 9 3

Because

this regulation

is

specific to the European Union, EU bond managers are at an even
greater competitive disadvantage compared with managers in North
America and Asia. Furthermore, these regulations will impose
financial,
personnel,
and information systems
considerable
technology costs on HFT and non-HFT firms alike.
Moreover, critics are concerned about the consistency of MiFID II
application across EU member states. Although the Delegated
Regulation and the technical standards will apply directly across the
European Union to all MiFID investment firms on a harmonized
basis, MiFID II (a directive) will need EU member states to
implement it into their own national regulatory schemes for any of it
to be effective. While stipulated that by the end of 2016 all EU
member states would be on a "level playing field," in some sense these
rules form a baseline or minimum for financial regulation, as several

191.

See generally EDMA EUROPE: LEADING TRADING VENUES ESTABLISH

ELECTRONIC DEBT MARKETS ASSOCIATION (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.edmae.org/edmal
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(Feb.
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European
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EU countries already have regulations in place that go beyond MiFID
II.194

As algorithmic trading and HFT firms face enhanced scrutiny by
EU regulators, some predict that EU member states will apply
additional national regulations. 195 Particular to HFT reporting
requirements, whether firms engaging in algorithmic trading or HFT
will be required to disclose commercially sensitive details, most
notably source codes, may become a question of how individual EU
member states implement MiFID II into their national legal
regimes.1 96

V.

POLICY CONCLUSION: How SHOULD REGULATORS CONTROL HFT?

Because US and EU efforts to define and regulate HFT activity
have come in the aftermath of, among other significant events, the
2008 Financial Crisis, the 2010 Flash Crash, and the 2016 Brexit
vote, it is too soon to predict how well they will be received, let alone
how successful they will prove long-term. At present, US financial
regulatory authorities could learn from the example of ESMA and the
European Commission. Much as US securities regulation generally
aims to slow down market activity to prevent speculative bubbles,
MiFID II will force the trading venues on which HFT takes place to
slow down the flow of orders and reduce trading activity. This should
protect investors against flash crashes by highlighting HFT's
liquidity and trade volume issues.
At present, US and EU regulators' efforts differ primarily in
scope. Through Reg SCI and Reg AT, US regulators have focused on
the securities market technology infrastructure surrounding HFT,
intervening at the operational level. The SEC designed Reg SCI to
create a framework of periodic tests and checks by which market
participants could better prepare for and overcome system
disruptions, from short term flash crashes to longer term crises like
the 2008 Financial Crisis. While Reg AT might more specifically
target HFT, it, too, seeks change at a relatively high level,
introducing more stringent registration requirements for new traders.
On the other hand, EU regulators have taken a much more
intensive approach. Compared with the MiFID and MiFIR
regulations, Reg SCI and Reg AT only scrape the surface by
instituting measures primarily aimed at transparency. While MiFID

194.
See Collette et al., supra note 185.
195.
See, e.g., KINDERMAN ET AL., supra note 187 (discussing Germany's taking
the lead on HFT regulation and France's imposition of requirements for firms or
individuals engaging in algorithmic trading).
196.
See id. (discussing uncertainty as to how commercially sensitive details will
be disclosed).
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II also requires transparency, it dives deeper by requiring traders to
limit activity in certain financial instruments to particular regulated
platforms and by setting strict organizational requirements on
trading firms and venues.
EU regulations regarding algorithmic source codes, too, are
much more comprehensive than US regulations. While EU regulators
require traders to submit source codes, US regulators have received
pushback against similar requirements on intellectual property
grounds, as businesses in other sectors fear further government
efforts to make more algorithms public. Thus, the success of a source
code-related regulation in the style of the European Union's intensive
effort is questionable.
In light of such resistance, the best option for US regulators may
be a "transparency within reason" approach. This would require
FINRA registration of firms engaging in HFT, much like the
Delegated Regulation requires for MiFID II firms. Such an approach
would also require subpoenas to access source code like those Reg AT
contemplates. Requiring subpoenas would protect intellectual
property as much as possible and avoid the potential EU individual
member state implementation problem regarding the disclosure of
commercially sensitive details.
Implementation itself is also a cross-border concern. Given the
amount of interaction between US and EU financial markets, one
could argue that their regulations should be harmonized, if not made
identical. Looking at US and EU regulations as two separate
financial regimes, US regulators can again learn from EU regulators
as they attempt to implement MiFID II to all EU member states.
While US states are more closely linked in government,
commerce, and culture than EU member states, US securities
exchanges, by virtue of trade volume and sheer number, can serve as
a proxy for EU member states in a discussion of how to effectively
implement one universal regulatory scheme. Politically, financial
regulation reform is arguably one of the most hotly contested issues of
the new US presidency. Given the prompt changes in the
international cooperative structure since the January 2017 US
presidential inauguration, coordination between the United States
and the European Union in terms of financial regulation may turn
out to be more difficult than recently anticipated.
While the case for international coordination is fairly strong, the
discrepancies between US and EU regulations as they stand may
provide incentive for traders to flock to US markets that, by
comparison, face lighter regulation. With fewer traders in their
markets, EU traders may face not only higher trading costs and lower
efficiency, but also lower costs for the markets at large. As such, US
regulators must tread carefully in pursuing new avenues for
regulating HFT. They should allow the European Union to serve as a
testing ground for such an all-encompassing, far-reaching regulation
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as MiFID II. However, they must consider the increasing influence of
HFT activity and how it is reshaping the securities landscape, both
intra- and internationally.
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